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I.   Introduction 
 
A fundamental characteristic of public finances is that they involve spending 
decisions over other people’s money. Above the level of  local administrations, 
governments do not, or only to a very limited extent, act like businesses that charge 
customers fees for particular activities. Instead, those who benefit from a particular 
program of public policy are generally not the same as those who pay for it. This 
incongruence moves distributional issues, i.e., the question of who pays and who 
benefits, to the center of decision making in public finances. 
Distributional conflicts have received much attention in efforts to explain the 
high and rising levels of public debts and deficits  observed since the early 1970s in 
many countries around the world. Figure 1 illustrates these trends for various 
countries. For a number of reasons, these developments are difficult to explain on 
the basis of conventional economics.  
According to Keynesian economics, fiscal policy is an important tool to control 
the level of aggregate demand in the economy. Governments should run deficits in 
times of recessions and surpluses in times of prosperity to stabilize the economy. 
The incipient deficits in the oil-crisis of the 1970s fit this prescription, but their 
persistence does not. Neo-classical economics, in contrast denies the stabilizing 
potential of fiscal policy. According to this theory, however, taxes cause distortions in 
the labor market, and the welfare costs of these distortions increase when tax rates 
are changes frequently. Governments faced with an unavoidable, yet temporary rise 
in spending, e.g., the response to a natural disaster or war, should, therefore, 
engage in tax smoothing, i.e., they should raise tax rates only by a small amount and 
run deficits until the need for extraordinary spending has disappeared. These 
governments would then run surpluses in normal times to repay their debts (Barro, 
1979).   Again, the persistence of the observed deficits does not fit this prescription, 
nor does the observation of large deficits in peace-times bode well with this view that 
tax-smoothing should be applied in times of national emergencies.  
One might argue that the increase in government debt during the 1970s was a 
response to low real interest rates, hence a low cost of borrowing. But the extent to 
which governments base their borrowing decisions on the level of real interest rates  
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in practice is much in doubt. Furthermore, the argument does not fit the 1980s and 
1990s, when real interest rates were much higher than in the 1970s. Finally, as 
Figure 1 shows, there is a large degree of variation in the fiscal performance across 
countries with relatively similar economic structures and environments; a variety that 
the conventional arguments cannot explain. 
The failure of conventional economics to explain these observations has 
sparked interest in explanations of a political-economy nature focusing on 
distributional conflicts. Key questions here are (1) can we explain large public deficits 
by political factors, and (2) can we explain differences in the fiscal performance of 
different governments by differences in the institutions governing their fiscal policies. 
Recent literature has developed positive answers to both questions. After shortly 
reviewing the arguments under the first question, this paper will focus on the second 
one. The main message is that institutions shaping the budget process of a country 
are an important factor in determining that country￿s level of public deficits and 
debts. The implication is that institutional reform of the budget process provides 
important protection against large deficits and debts.   
A number of recent examples highlight the relevance of and public interest in 
the budget process. In the US, much of the political efforts to reduce the federal 
deficit focused on institutional design: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act which 
imposed deficit targets on the federal budget, the Budget Enforcement Act which 
protects the budget agreements between the President and Congress against 
subsequent amendment, and, most recently, the strife for a Balanced Budget 
Amendment. In Europe, compliance with the fiscal norms of the Maastricht Treaty 
became a precondition for entering the European Monetary Union; national 
differences in the translation of these norms into the domestic budgeting institutions 
of the member states explain much of the differences in the success of reaching the 
norms. 
 
II. Deficits and „Raw“ Politics: A Brief Review 
 
The first strand of literature attempts to explain large government deficits as 
the result of ￿raw￿ politics, i.e., political processes defined entirely by political  
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incentives of the parties in government with no consideration to the institutional 
environment.  Large deficits are an indication of a government￿s inability to decide 
who should pay the cost of its activities. Governments that are politically weak or 
unstable use the option of deficits to postpone that decision.  
This view identifies a number of political fundamentals leading to large 
deficits: a high degree of political polarization among the electorate, coalition 
governments consisting of a large number of parties, and unstable coalition 
governments. Members of the executive who expect to lose their positions do not 
anticipate dealing with the consequences of their actions, and increase public debts 
beyond what they would choose otherwise.1  Governments expecting to lose power 
soon to an opposition with very different spending priorities may chose to run large 
deficits, because the increase in debt service constrains the spending choices of the 
opponent (Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Coalition governments are less able to deal 
with negative fiscal shocks as they face an internal prisoner’s dilemma in allocating 
the budget cuts. Individual coalition partners may have sufficient power to block 
changes in spending, but not enough leverage to effect changes in revenues 
(Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Alesina and Perotti, 1995).   As electoral systems of 
proportional representation (PR) tend to produce coalition governments, while 
plurality systems produce single-party governments (see below), this literature 
concludes that PR systems have a deficit bias; a conclusion that motivated Italy’s 
revision of the electoral system in the early 1990s. 
These conjectures have received much interest, but their empirical support 
has been uneven at best. Roubini and Sachs’s  (1989) estimates suggest that 
countries with PR systems tend to have higher deficits.  In a reconsideration of their 
dataset, however, Edin and Ohlsson (1991) find that minority governments, rather 
than PR states per se, are more likely to run large budget deficits.  Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) confirm a link between coalition governments and low success rates in 
the implementation of fiscal consolidations, but discover that minority governments 
are the most fiscally responsible form of government in their sample. De Haan and 
Sturm (1994), in a pooled time-series analysis of European countries, find no 
                                                           
1 . Persson and Svensson 1989; Roubini and Sachs 1989; Alesina and Tabellini 1990; Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini 1991; Hahm 1994. 
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statistically significant relationship at all between the form of government and budget 
deficits. Lambertini (1997) finds no empirical support for the hypothesis that 
governments in OECD countries run larger deficits when they are likely to be voted 
out of office. Overall, the empirical evidence produced under this argument has 
shown little robustness. One weakness is quite obvious: To explain the emergence 
of large deficits in the 1970s and 1980s, this literature would have to show that 
political polarization and instability of government increased in that period over the 
1950s and 1960s.  
In one sense, the empirical failure of this literature is good news: Since 
political fundamentals of the kind considered here are very hard to change, this 
literature provides little hope for improving the fiscal performance of governments. 
 
III. Political Economy of Government Budgeting 
 
This brings us to the second approach mentioned above.  Here, the political 
fundamentals are taken as given. The focus is instead on the institutional 
environment in which decisions regarding public finances are made. The idea is not 
to deny the importance of political fundamentals; rather, it is  that decision making 
rules and institutions are important determinants of fiscal performance. Such 
institutions shape the effect political fundamentals have on fiscal choices and 
outcomes; and at the same time, the effectiveness of institutions depends on political 
fundamentals.  
The budget process is the center of the attention under this approach. In the 
broadest sense, the budget process is a system of formal and informal rules   
governing the decision making process that leads to the formulation of a budget by 
the executive, its passage through the legislature, and its implementation. These 
rules divide this process into steps, determine who does what and when and 
regulate the flow of information among the participants. The budget process thus  
distributes strategic influence and creates or destroys opportunities for collusion. The 
chief  constitutional function of  the budget process is to be the locus of conflict 
resolution between competing claims on public finances (Wildavsky, 1975).  
Budget processes must deliver two types of decisions simultaneously. They  
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must determine the main fiscal aggregates - spending, revenues, and the deficit - 
and they must provide a solution to the allocation problem of spending and 
revenues. That these two types of decisions are intricately related to each other is 
easily understood by contrasting two alternative forms budgeting. With bottom-up 
budgeting, the aggregates follow simply from adding up the appropriations 
determined individually in the budget process. With top-down  budgeting, the 
aggregates are fixed first, and the individual appropriations determined by dividing up 
these aggregates.2  
In this paper, we focus entirely on the aggregates and take the deficit in 
particular as a measure of aggregate fiscal discipline. The basic hypothesis, 
developed below, is that the quality of the budget process as a constitutional 
instrument for conflict resolution is an determinant of the fiscal performance of 
governments and an important part in securing aggregate fiscal discipline.  
A budget process can only fulfil its constitutional role effectively, if all conflicts 
between competing claims on public finances are indeed resolved within its 
framework. Four deviations from this principle undermine the functioning of the 
budget process. The first is the existence of off-budget funds used to finance 
government activities. Off-budget funds allow policy makers to circumvent the 
constraints of the budget process and remove their decisions altogether from being 
challenged by conflicting distributional interests. Germany￿s experience in the 
1990s is a prime example for the adverse consequences of off-budget funds. In the 
post-unification period, such funds mushroomed and contributed largely to the 
federal government￿s loss of control over public spending (Sturm, 1997).    
The second deviation is the spreading of non-decisions in the budget process. 
Non-decisions occur, when expenditures included in the budget are determined by 
developments exogenous to the budget process. Prime examples are the indexation 
of spending programs to the price level or aggregate nominal income, and open-
ended spending appropriations, e.g., welfare payments that are based on 
                                                           
2. According to a popular myth among budgeting practitioners, the top-down approach produces smaller fiscal 
aggregates and is, therefore, preferable to achieve fiscal discipline. This myth fails to recognize that policy 
makers realize the constraints for the allocation problem they set at the first stage of the top-down process and 
are able to increase the aggregate at that stage to make more room for decisions at the subsequent stages. 
(Ferejohn and Krehbiel, 1987). Experimental evidence shows that sequence and size of the budget aggregates 
are not systematically linked (von Hagen and Gardner, 1996).   
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entitlements whose parameters are fixed by simple law or decree, and the 
government wage bill.
3  Non-decisions conveniently allow policy makers to avoid   
decisions that would seem ￿tough￿ on their constituencies (Weaver, 1986), but 
degrade the budget process to a mere  forecast of  exogeneous developments; 
failures to predict these correctly then become a source of excessive spending and 
deficits.
4  
The third deviation is the existence of mandatory spending, where laws other 
than the budget make certain government expenditures compulsory. For example, 
the Italian constitution allows parliament to pass simple laws mandating specific 
expenditures for which the budget later has to make provision.
5 The budget then 
becomes a mere summary of the existing spending mandates created by simple 
legislation. An effective budget process requires a clear distinction between non-
financial laws (which create the authorization for certain government undertakings) 
and the budget, which makes specific funds available for a specific time period.  
The fourth deviation occurs when the government enters into contingent 
liabilities such as guarantees for the liabilities of other public or non-public entities. 
Promises, implicit or explicit, to bail out subnational governments (as in Germany in 
the mid-1990s), regional development banks (as in Brazil), or financial institutions 
(as in the Savings and Loans debacle in the US) can suddenly turn into large 
government expenditures outside the ordinary budget. While one must recognize 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
3. Note that there is nothing natural about determining wage, social security, and welfare expenditures outside 
the annual budget process. Indeed, setting the relevant parameters is a part of the annual budget process in some 
countries. Another way to limit the open-endedness of entitlements, used in Denmark,  is to set cash limits on 
welfare appropriations and require the relevant minister to propose spending adjustments and changes in the 
relevant non-financial laws if these limits are overrun.  (von Hagen and Harden, 1994) 
4. Where non-decisions prevail strongly, the government budget becomes heavily dependent on institutions 
outside the annual budget process, i.e., wage setting institutions in the public sector, the social security system, 
the welfare system, and labor market regulations.  Under such circumstances, fiscal discipline becomes heavily 
dependend on the quality of a country=s institutions outside the budget process as well.  Germany=s experience 
with unification illustrate the point. There, weaknesses in the labor market legislation extended immediately to 
East Germany allowed unions and employers associations to raise the fiscal cost of unification by reaching wage 
agreements that kept East German labor from competing for jobs in West Germany, and implied generous 
unemployment payments to East German workers instead. (See von Hagen, 1997 for details.) 
5. A reform of the Italian budget process in 1978 introduced the Financial Act which, preceding the Budget Law, 
can modify existing expenditure laws. The reform did not, however, succeed in making the budget provess the 
center of conflict resolution over government finances (von Hagen and Harden, 1994).  
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that a proper accounting of contingent liabilities is a difficult task, their existence and 
importance for the government’s financial stance can be brought to the attention of 
decision makers in the budget process by requiring the government to submit a 
report on the financial guarantees it has entered into as part of the budget 





III.1. Budgeting as a Common Pool Resource Problem 
 
A fundamental characteristic of modern public finances is that government 
activities tend to be targeted at specific groups while being  paid for by the general 
taxpayer.
6 This is most visible when policy makers represent mainly geographical 
constituencies, such as in the US.  Politicians representing individual electoral 
districts make all efforts  to channel money  out of the national government￿s tax 
fund into public policy projects benefiting their districts. As voters living an electoral 
district do not have to pay the full cost of a particular project while receiving the full 
benefit, their representatives ask for more and larger projects than they would 
otherwise. For example, the representative of  a local electoral district will appreciate 
the full value of road improvements for the local economy. But since his district pays 
only a small portion of the central government's tax revenues, he will ask for more 
road improvements when the central government pays for them than when they have 
to be paid for by local taxes.   
Applying this argument to political systems where political representation is 
based on functional or other social groups (workers, farmers, or ethnic and religious 
groups) rather than geography requires a translation of  the geographical dimension 
into one of different constituencies in society. Politicians representing different 
groups in society spend money taken out of a general tax fund on transfers to 
different groups in society, farmers, workers and enterprises in different industries, 
                                                           
6.See e.g. Buchanan and Tullock (1962).   
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home owners, etc.
7  The incongruence between the beneficiaries of individual 
programs and the general tax payer remains, and with it the tendency to demand 
more national government spending than each group would ask for if it had to face 
the full cost of the programs benefiting it. 
 
  
                                                           
7. Italy=s experience with growing welfare payments is a prime example for this mechanism. In the past 30 
years, Italian politicians used the disability pension system quite openly to buy voter support. See New York 
Times, Sept. 19, 1997.   
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The core of the argument 
then is that public budgeting 
involves an externality - money 
from a general tax fund is used 
to finance  projects benefiting 
particular groups in society. This 
situation resembles the classic 
common pool resource (CPR) 
problem in public economics: 
Many farmers drawing water 
from the same pool, each 
considering only  his own 
business, end up overusing the pool. As the source dries up, less water is left for 
everyone than a wise use of the common pool would have permitted. In the 
budgeting context, the result is that the central government budget grows too large, 
Box 1: The Common Pool Problem of 
Budgeting 
 
Consider a group of  N individuals, each of who 
receive an income y, purchase consumption 
goods c at a price of  one, and pay taxes, t. Each 
individual also receives a public service x  with a 
unit cost of one, the provision of which is paid out 
of taxes. Thus, the total revenue required to 
supply Nx units of the pubic service is T = Nx. All 
individuals pay the same taxes,  t = T/N.   
Budgeting now consists of a choice of a level of 
the public service given the budget constraint. 
Consider a budget process in which each 
individual chooses his preferred level of x given 
the choice of the other individuals. Each 
individual will perceive that the relevant budget 
constraint for his choice is y - T/N = y - Sum x / 
N. Therefore, the perceived price for an increase 
in his level of public service is 1/N. This budget 
line is the line AA in figure 2. Let the individual’s 
preferences be described by the indifference 
curve II. Then the choice is the level x*. 
Now consider the choice of all other individuals. 
Since all are the same by assumption, all choose 
the same level of x. Hence, the equilibrium level 
is x* for all, and the resulting tax is t = x*. But with 
this tax, each individual ends up on a lower 
indifference curve then he perceived to be on in 
his choice. 
The clue to this problem is for each individual to 
realize that all others are behaving in the same 
way as he. Therefore, the true price of an 
increase the level of the public service is 1. That 
is, the true budget line for each individual has a 
slope of one, as shown by the line BB. Given this 
budget line, each individual chooses a lower level 
of x, x’, and the resulting tax is t’= x’. The figure 
shows that this choice leaves our individual on a 
higher  indifference curve. Decentralized decision 
making thus entails overspending  on public 
goods and a welfare loss. 
x 
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and the government￿s need for revenues with it. The core of the CPR problem can 
be explained in the simple example offered in Box 1.  
As the example shows, the basic issue is that decentralized decision makers 
assume themselves to be operating under a wrong budget constraint: Each of them 
works under the assumption that an increase in spending providing him with more 
public services will cost him only the fraction of the total expenditure corresponding 
to his share in total taxes. As a result all decision makers ask for more public 
services than they would if they realized the true budget constraint, namely that, if all 
decision makers behave in the same way, each one is charge the full cost of the 
services demanded. The examples shows two important characteristics of the CPR 
problem. First, the larger the number of decision makers drawing in the same 
general tax  fund, the steeper is the assumed budget constraint and the more severe 
is the overspending bias. Second, forcing the decision makers to realize the true 
budget constraint leads them to make the efficient decision.  
Putting this argument into a realistic context, where money can be borrowed 
to finance current spending, one can show that this externality implies excessive 
deficits and government debts, too.
8 
 
III.2. Fragmentation and Centralization of the Budget Process 
 
The analogy of government budgeting with a CPR problem suggests that 
large government deficits are the result of a coordination failure: Decision makers 
involved in public budgeting fail to account for the full cost in terms of current and 
future taxes of their spending decisions. We call this lack of a comprehensive view of 
the cost implications of spending decisions fragmentation of the budget process. The 
opposite of fragmentation is centralization of the budget process. A centralized 
budget process is one that strongly coordinates the spending decisions of individual 
decision makers and forces them to take a comprehensive view of the budget.
9 
Fragmentation and centralization of the budget process depend critically on 
                                                           
8.See Velasco (forthcoming), von Hagen and Harden (1996). 
9.Centralization of the budget process should not be confused with centralizing government, i.e., giving more 
power to the central compared to local governments.   
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the quality of its institutional design. Decision making rules in the budget process can 
increase centralization by forcing decision makers to take the cost an increase in 
spending favoring their constituencies implies for other constituencies into account. 
For example,  several European parliaments allow their members to propose 
amendments to the budget proposal on the floor only if the proposal leaves the 
overall level of spending unchanged. Thus, a member of parliament wishing to raise 
spending for his constituency is forced to propose whose constituency should pay 
the bill. Rules of this kind force decision makers to confront each other￿s 
distributional interests explicitly and facilitate an efficient solution to the CPR problem 
through a bargaining process. 
 
III.4. Institutional Elements of Centralization 
 
Budget processes can be proximately divided into four stages, an executive 
planning stage, a legislative approval stage, an executive implementation stage, and 
an  ex-post control stage, see Table 1. Each stage involves different actors with 
different roles. The executive planning stage usually begins more than a year before 
the relevant fiscal year and ends with the submission of a draft budget to the 
legislature. It involves the setting of budget guidelines, bids for budget appropriations 
from the various spending departments, the resolution of conflicts between the 
spending interests in the executive, and the drafting of the revenue budget. The 
legislative approval stage includes the process of parliamentary amendments to the 
budget proposal, which may involve more than one house of parliament. This stage 
ends with the passing of the budget law. The executive implementation stage 
comprizes the fiscal year to which the budget law applies. During the implementation 
stage, deviations from the budget law can occur, either formally by adoption of 
supplementary budget laws in parliament, or informally by shifting funds between 
chapters of the budget law and by overrunning the spending limits provided by the 
law. 
Institutional elements of centralization concern the first three stages, with 
different elements applying to different stages. At the executive planning stage, the 
purpose of such elements is to promote an agreement on budget guidelines  
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(spending and deficit targets) among all actors involved, ensuring fiscal discipline. 
Elements of centralization must at this stage foster consistent setting of such 
guidelines and assure that they constrain executive decisions effectively. A key 
element here concerns the way conflicts among members of the executive are 
resolved throughout the budget process.  Uncoordinated and ad hoc conflict 
resolution involving many actors simultaneously promotes log-rolling and reciprocity 
and, hence, minimizes centralization. Centralization is increased, if conflict resolution 
is the role of senior cabinet committees or the prime minister.  
At the legislative approval stage, elements of centralization control the debate 
and voting procedure in parliament. Because of the much larger number of decision 
makers involved, the CPR problem is even larger in the legislature than in the 
executive. Fragmentation is maximized, when there are no limits to the changes 
parliament can make to the executive's budget proposal, when spending decisions 
are made in legislative committees with narrow and dispersed authorities 
(balkanization of committees, Crain and Miller, 1990), and when there is little 
guidance of the parliamentary process either by the executive or by the speaker. 
Centralization, therefore, comes with strengthening the executive's agenda setting 
power in parliament by placing limits on scope of amendments, controlling the voting 
procedure, and raising the political stakes of a rejection of the executive's budget, 
e.g., by making this equivalent to a vote of non-confidence. Centralization also 
comes with strengthening the role of the speaker and the financial committee in the 
budget process. In bi-cameral systems, centralization is increased by limiting the 
budgetary powers of the upper house. 
At the implementation stage, elements of centralization assure that the budget 
law effectively constrains the spending decisions of the executive. One important 
element of this is strengthening the finance minister's ability to monitor and control 
the spending flows during the fiscal year. Other important elements are strict 
limitations on changes of the budget law during the year.  
Reviewing elements of centralization in OECD, Latin American and Asian 
governments reveals that centralization comes in two prototypes. The first is 
centralization based on delegation. Under this approach, individual participants in the 
budget process that are assumed to have a more comprehensive view of the budget  
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than the remaining ones are vested with special strategic powers that give them a 
position of strategic dominance. The second approach is centralization based on 
contracts. This approach emphasizes negotiation of binding agreements among all 
participants, without lending special authorities to any one of them. Table 2 
compares these approaches with a fragmented budget process. 
 
IV.4.1. Delegation  
 
With delegation, the budget process lends special authority to a "fiscal 
entrepreneur" whose function is to set the broad parameters of the budget and to 
assure that all other participants in the process cooperate. To be effective, this 
entrepreneur must have the ability to monitor the others, and to use selective 
punishments against participants unwilling to cooperate with him. Among the cabinet 
members, the entrepreneur is typically the finance minister. Since the finance 
minister is not bound by individual spending interests as much as those heading the 
spending departments, and since the finance minister typically is charged with 
drafting the revenue budget, it is plausible to assume that the finance minister takes 
the most comprehensive view of the budget among the members of the executive 
except, possible, the prime minister. Delegation at the executive planning stage, 
then, involves vesting the finance minister with special authorities over the other 
cabinet members. 
In practice, this can take a variety of forms. In the French model of delegation, 
the finance minister together with the prime minister determines the overall 
allocations of the spending departments. These targets, set out in the lettre 
d'encadrement at the beginning of executive planning stage, are considered binding 
for the remainder of the process. Here, the finance minister has a strong role as 
agenda setter in the budget process.  
In contrast, the German model of delegation gives the finance minister veto 
power in all cabinet decisions with financial implications, this veto can only be 
overruled by a cabinet majority including the chancelor. In this model, the finance 
minister can prevent decisions he does not like, but has much less influence in 
shaping the budget demands of his colleagues.   
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The British model of delegation, finally, evolves as a series of bilateral 
negotiations between the spending departments and the finance minister in which 
the latter bases his bargaining power  on superior information, seniority, and the 
political back-up from the prime minister.    
Drafting the budget proposal under the delegation approach is mainly the 
responsibility of the finance ministry, which monitors the individual bids, negotiates 
directly with the spending departments and approves the bids submitted to the final 
cabinet meeting. Unresolved conflicts between individual spending and the finance 
ministers are arbitrated by the prime minister. 
At the legislative stage, the delegation approach lends large agenda-setting 
powers to the executive over parliament. One important instrument here is limits on 
the scope of amendments parliamentarians can make to the executive's budget 
proposal. In Spain, for example, proposals to increase expenditures for one 
budgetary item can only be received in parliament if they propose an expenditure 
reduction elsewhere; amendments to reduce taxes cannot be received at all.10 In 
France, amendments cannot be received unless they reduce expenditures or create 
a new source of public revenues. In Britain, amendments proposing new charges on 
public revenues require the consent of the executive.  Such restrictions make the 
budget constraint being felt more powerfully.  
A second element concerns the voting procedure. The French government, 
for example, can force the legislature to vote on large parts of or the entire budget in 
a block vote, with only those amendments considered that the executive is willing to 
accept. In the UK, the executive can make the vote on the budget a vote of 
confidence, thus raising the stakes for a rejection considerably.  
A final element concerns the budgetary authority of the upper house. Where 
both houses have equal budgetary authority, as in Italy or Belgium, finding a 
compromize between the two houses is a necessary part of the budget process. It 
can become a lengthy and complicated bargaining process with a tendency to settle 
on more rather than less spending. This tends to weaken the position of the 
executive as it now faces two opponent bodies. To strengthen the executive, the 
budgetary authority of the upper house may be limited as in France, Germany, or 
                                                           
 10. Both rules can be disregarded if the executive supports the amendment.  
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Spain, where the lower house prevails if an agreement between the two chambers 
cannot be reached. In the UK, the upper house has no budgetary authority at all, 
leaving the executive with only one chamber to deal with in the budget process. The 
position of the executive can also be strengthened by giving the finance minister veto 
power over the budget passed by the legislature, as in Germany and Spain. 
At the implementation stage, finally, centralization requires that the finance 
minister be able to monitor and control the flow of expenditures during the year. This 
may take the form of requiring that the spending departments obtain the finance 
minister’s authorization to disburse funds (over a minimum amount) during the year.  
To be effective, this must not be limited to a mere checking of the legal basis of a 
disbursement, as was the case, e.g., in Italy in the 1980s. The finance minister’s 
authority to impose cash limits during the year is another control mechanism. 
Monitoring spending flows during the year requires a unified system of financial 
accounts enabling the finance minister to watch the inflow and outflow of resources. 
Effective monitoring and control is important to enforce the spending limits on the 
individual spending departments foreseen in the budget and to prevent them from 
behaving strategically, i.e., spending their appropriations early in the year to demand 
supplementary funds later.   
  Furthermore, centralization requires to limit the scope for changes in the 
original budget law through the modification of appropriations. One element here is 
require that transfer within   chapters be authorized by the finance minister, and that 
broader transfers require authorization from parliament. The same applies to 
transfers of funds between different fiscal years. Although carry-over provisions have 
obvious efficiency gains, their use should be limited and strictly monitored to assure 
that the finance minister can keep track of a spending department’s financial 
position. Another element is to restrict the use of supplementary budgets to truly 
exceptional circumstances. Where supplementary budgets during the fiscal  become 
norm, as in Italy and Belgium in the 1980s and Germany in the 1990s, one cannot 
expect that policy makers wil take the constraints embedded in the original budget 
law serious. 
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III.4.2. The Contract Approach 
 
Under a contract approach, the budget process starts with an agreement on a 
set of binding fiscal targets negotiated among the members of the executive. 
Emphasis here is on the bargaining process as a mechanism to reveal the 
externalities involved in budget decisions and on the binding nature of the targets. In 
contrast to the hierarchical structure created by delegation, the contract approach 
relies on a more equal distribution of strategic powers in the executive. A prime 
example for this approach is the Danish budget process which, since 1982, starts 
with negotiations among the cabinet members fixing spending limits for each 
spending department. Often, these spending limits are derived from medium-term 
fiscal programs or the coalition agreement among the ruling parties. In Ireland, for 
example, coalition agreements since 1989 included medium term fiscal strategies to 
reduce the public debt, which provided the background to the annual negotiations 
over budget targets. 
The finance ministry's role under this approach is to evaluate the consistency 
of the individual departments' spending plans with these limits. As in the 
Netherlands, for example, the finance minister usually has an information advantage 
over the spending ministers in the budget negotiations, but no extra strategic 
powers. Conflict resolution involves senior cabinet committees and often the leaders 
of the coalition parties in the legislature.  
At the legislative stage, the contract approach places less weight on the 
executive’s role as an agenda setter and more weight on the role of the legislature 
monitoring the faithful implementation of the fiscal targets. Institutionally, this means 
that the contract approach relies less on controlling parliamentary amendments and 
more on the legislature's ability to monitor the fiscal performance of the executive. 
One important element of this is the legislature's right to request information from the 
executive. It can be improved by setting up committees whose authorities reflect the 
authorities of the spending departments, and by giving committees a formal right to 
request information from the executive and to call witnesses from the executive to 
testify before committees. The Danish parliament, for example, has all three of these  
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rights, while the German parliament conforms only to the first provision and the 
British parliament to neither one.  
At the implementation stage, the contract approach resembles the delegation 
approach in emphasizing the monitoring and control powers of the finance minister.   
 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
 
As argued above, political economy claims that institutional design of the 
budget process is an important determinant of aggregate fiscal discipline. A growing 
body of research now exists to support that claim. Next, we summarize the main 
results of that research.   
 
IV.1. Measuring Fragmentation and Centralization 
 
Estimating the impact of centralization on aggregate fiscal performance 
requires a measure of centralization. Early research in this area, while focusing on 
budget processes on American state governments, took an ecclectic approach, 
using dummy variables for the existence or absence of specific institutional elements 
such as amendment restrictions in parliament. This approach is impractical for 
international comparisons, because the existing data sets are relatively small and 
institutional elements are often not directly comparable. The ecclectic approach 
would, therefore, quickly exhaust any degrees of freedom in an econometric 
analysis. 
A more recent literature starting with von Hagen (1992) has, therefore, 
reverted to the construction of indices measuring centralization. These indices 
attempt to translate qualitative information about the budget process taken from 
questionnaires and legal documents into quantitative measures. An immediate 
implication is that such indices have only an ordinal interpretation, they provide 
rankings of countries within a sample. A second implication is that indices are 
sample-specific, index values for countries in different samples are extremely difficult 
to compare. A third implication is that the index necessarily involves a certain degree  
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of arbitrariness, which makes the existence of several independent studies 
particularly important. 
Index construction generally proceeds as follows. In the first step, information 
about budget processes is collected from legislative documents and questionnaires 
completed by finance ministry officials, central bankers and other experts. Next, for 
each item on the questionnaire, this information is cast in numerical form by 
assigning numbers to individual types of answers. For example, the question "are 
there any limits on parliamentary amendments to the executive’s budget proposal" 
could have answers of the following type: no; proposals to increase expenditures 
must propose a source of increasing revenues;  proposals to increase expenditures 
must propose a cut in expenditures elsewhere, amendments can only reduce 
expenditures; no amendments can be received. The index would then give zero 
points to the first answer and an increasing number of points to the following 
categories. 
All indexes used in the literature follow von Hagen (1992) and include a 
special category measuring the informational quality of the budget process. Here, the 
focus is on the comprehensiveness of the budget documents, their link to national 
accounting statistics and their transparency. The underlying reasoning is that 
delegation and contracts can only work effectively if the budget process reveals 
accurate information about the fiscal stance and intentions of the government.   
Third, the values assigned to each individual item on the budget must be 
aggregated to a comprehensive index. This is a critical step, because it involves 
judgement about the substitutability and the interdependence of institutional 
elements. Adding up the numbers for amendment controls and similar numbers 
concerning, say, the voting procedure implicitly assumes that strengthening 
amendment controls can make good for a weaker control of the voting procedure.
11 
Furthermore, multiplicative aggregation of the index emphasizes interdependence of 
institutional  elements more than additive aggregation. 
With these problems in mind, however, using indexes of centralization is still 
the best one can do in testing the basic hypothesis. In all studies reported below, a 
                                                           
11.Alesina et al (1996) and Strauch (1998) propose non-linear transformations of individual sub-indices to test 
for substitutability.   
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high value on the index signals a large degree of centralization. Thus, we expect a 
negative coefficient on this index in a regression using government deficits or debt 
on the left hand side.   
The indices proposed in the literature are typically constructed for a time 
periods of a decade and remain constant in that period. This indicates that budget 
institutions are typically quite stable. An exception is the index constructed by 
Alesina et al for Latin America, who provide a time series reflecting several changes 
in Latin American budgeting institutions over the last two decades.  
 
IV.2. International Evidence 
 
Figure 2 presents the index of centralization constructed by von Hagen and 
Harden (1996) for 15 European Union countries together with the surplus ratios in 
terms of GDP of these countries in the 1980s and the 1990s. To emphasize the long-
run effect of institutions this figure uses five-year averages of deficit and debt ratios. 
Clearly, countries ranking high on the index of centralization are countries with 
relatively low deficits and debts in the period under consideration. Figure 3 presents 
the index of centralization constructed by Stein et al.  (1997) together with the 
primary surplus for 20 Latin American countries. Again, the correlation between 
surpluses and centralization of the budget process is visible. Figure 4, finally, shows 
the index of centralization constructed by Lao-Araya (1997) for 11 Asian countries 
together with their primary surplus ratios. The same correlation stands out. 
This evidence can also be summarized in the simple regressions displayed in 
Table 3. In all three samples, the coefficient of the index of centralization is 
statistically strongly significant. This is clear evidence supporting our basic 
hypothesis.   
Bivariate regressions are, of course, extremely limited in power. Table 4 
reports the results of panel regressions for the European and Latin American 
countries. In each regression, a measure of the government deficit is employed, and 
the regression controls for economic  factors such as economic growth, 
unemployment, and the interest rate together with a set of political variables. Two 
results are worth noting. First, the index of centralization is negative and statistically  
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significant. This confirms the basic hypothesis. This says that countries with 
relatively more centralized budget processes are countries with relatively lower 
average deficits. Second, all other political control variables except the dummy 
indicating a change in the executive during the relevant year are non-significant in 
explaining government deficits. This confirms the empirical problems of the „raw 
politics“ approach. 
Table 5 adds evidence from American state governments. While these are 
related through the same political, federal and monetary system, it is also possible to 
think of them as small open economies. The table shows that here, again, 
centralization has a significant positive impact on the budget surplus. Tommasi and 
Jones (forthcoming) show similar results for a sample of Argentine provinces. Again, 
centralization of the budget process is found to produce significantly lower deficits. 
To summarize, the empirical evidence confirms the claim that institutional 
characteristics of the budget process affect aggregate fiscal discipline.  
 
V. Institutional Choice in Democratic Settings 
 
The empirical tests reported above confirm the importance of budgeting 
institutions for achieving aggregate fiscal discipline. They do not, however, 
distinguish between the contract and the delegation approach. We now ask what 
determines the choice between these two. 
  As indicated above, a critical difference between the delegation and the 
contract approach is that the former relies on hierarchical structures while the latter 
relies on an even distribution of authorities.  In democratic governments, hierarchical 
structures typically prevail within political parties, while inter-party relations are more 
even. This suggests that the key to the institutional choice lies in the number of 
parties involved in the budget process.   
 
V.1. Parliamentary Systems 
 
In parliamentary systems, this means that the delegation is the proper 
approach for single-party, while contracts is the proper approach for multi-party  
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coalition governments (Hallerberg and von Hagen, 1997). There are two reasons 
behind this conjecture.  
First, members of the same political party are more likely to have similar 
political views regarding the basic spending priorities than members of different 
political parties. The spending minister in a one-party government can, therefore, be 
fairly sure that the finance minister holds more or less the same spending 
preferences as they do; their disagreements with the finance minister will be mainly a 
result of the CPR problem. In a coalition government, in contrast, cabinet members 
are likely to have different views regarding the distribution of government spending 
over the groups of recipients. Agreement on a budget, therefore, involves a 
compromise between the coalition partners regarding the distribution of funds for a 
given budget size.  
For a coalition government, delegation then creates a new principal agent 
problem. A strong  finance minister might abuse his powers and unduly promote the 
political interests of his own party in the setting of broad budgetary targets. The 
same principal agent problem does not arise in the contracts approach, since the 
contracts are negotiated by all cabinet members.  Thus, governments formed by two 
or more parties are more likely to opt for the contracts approach. 
Second, delegation and contracts rely on different enforcement mechanisms 
of the budget agreement.  In one-party governments, the ultimate punishment for a 
spending minister reneging on the budget agreement is dismissal from office.  Such 
punishment is heavy  for the individual  minister who overspends, but generally light 
for the government as a whole.  It is based on the fact that prime ministers in one-
party governments are typically the strongest members of their cabinets and have 
the power and authority to select and reshuffle their cabinet members.  In   coalition 
governments, however, a punishments cannot be directed easily to the defecting 
minister.  The distribution of portfolios is, as far as the sitting prime minister is 
concerned, exogenously given by the coalition agreement. The  prime minister 
cannot easily dismiss or otherwise discipline intransigent spending ministers from a 
different party, since that would be regarded as an intrusion into the internal party 
affairs of his coalition partners. The most important punishment mechanism here is 
the threat that the coalition breaks up if a spending minister reneges on the budget  
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agreement. Thus, punishment leads to the death of the government rather than the 
dismissal of a single individual. The point is illustrated by the fact that fiscal targets 
are often part of the coalition agreement.  
The credibility of the enforcement mechanism in coalition governments hinges 
on two important factors. First, it requires the existence of  alternative coalition 
partners.  If another partner exists with whom the aggrieved party can form a 
coalition, the threat to leave the coalition is clearly more credible than if  no 
alternative coalition partner is available. The number of parties in parliament 
regarded to be  potential candidates for a coalition is, therefore, one factor of the 
credibility of the enforcement. Second, the coalition may be broken up with the 
anticipation of new elections. The credibility of the enforcement then depends 
critically on the expected election outcomes. 
Germany's budgetary difficulties in the 1990s illustrate the point. While the 
large coalition partner pushed for more spending and higher taxes, the smaller 
partner insisted on reducing taxes and cutting the welfare system. However, a 
coalition involving the  smaller partner and one of the opposition parties was clearly 
ruled out by the latter, and polls indicated that the party might not be in parliament 
after elections. In this constellation, the larger partner got his way.  
The different enforcement mechanisms also explain the different relations 
between the executive and the legislature in the second phase of the budget 
process. Single-party governments typically arise in two-party settings such as pre-
1994 New Zealand or Britain, where each party is large and party discipline is low. 
While the ruling party enjoys a majority in parliament, the main concern of the 
legislative stage is to limit the scope of defections from the budget proposals by 
individual members of parliament who wish to divert government funds to their 
electoral districts. Multi-party coalitions, in contrast, typically arise in settings where 
parties are small, relatively homogeneous and party discipline is strong. In that 
situation, defections from the budget agreement are a weaker concern, but each 
party involved in the coalition will want to watch carefully that the executive sticks to 
the coalition agreement. The delegation approach, therefore, typically makes the 
executive a much stronger  agenda setter in parliament than the contract approach, 
while the latter lends more monitoring powers to the legislature than the former.  
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Table 6 illustrates this point by showing that parliamentary committees in countries 
adhering to the contract approach are typically in a stronger position to collect 
information from the executive than committees in countries relying on the delegation 
approach.   
Finally, the commitment to fiscal targets embedded in the contract approach is 
not credible for one-party governments. To see this, consider a single-party 
government with a weak prime and finance minister.  Assume that this government 
settled on a set of fiscal targets at the outset of the budget process and that some 
spending ministers renege on the agreement during the implementation phase. In 
this case, the other cabinet members cannot credibly threaten the defector with a 
dissolution of the government, since they would punish themselves by calling for 
elections. Absent a credible threat, the entire cabinet would just walk away from the 
initial agreement. 
To summarize, coalition government will typically choose a contract approach 
  and single-party governments will typically choose delegation as an institutional 
mechanism to remedy the CPR problem of budgeting. 
 
V.2. Electoral Institutions 
   
Electoral institutions strongly influence the number of party players in 
government.  One important factor is the number of parties that gain legislative 
seats; if there are few parties, there is a higher chance that one party can win an 
absolute majority, and an absolute majority is a virtual certainty in two-party systems. 
 Several studies indicate that the number of parties in a given system is strongly and 
positively correlated with the number of representatives elected from each electoral 
district.  This number is generally known as district magnitude (Duverger 1954; 
Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 1993). Electoral systems with low district magnitudes 
distribute seats less proportionately than those with large district magnitudes, and 
lower proportionality favors larger parties. In France, for example, the conservative 
parties won just 44% of the total votes cast in 1993 but over 80% of the National 
Assembly seats under the two-stage plurality system with a district magnitude of 1.  
This disproportionality can exist even in proportional representation states if the  
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district magnitude is low--in Spain, for example, where the average district 
magnitude is just 6.7, the Socialist party was able to win 44% of the popular vote in 
the 1986 national elections but 52% of the seats in the Congress of Deputies.
12  At 
the other extreme, the Netherlands has only one electoral district composed of 150 
seats for the entire country, and a party that wins less than one percent of the 
national vote can gain seats in parliament.
13 
Plurality systems, which elect only one representative per district, encourage 
two-party systems, and they are consequently most likely to have one-party majority 
governments.  PR systems have more variation in their district magnitudes, though 
the magnitudes are always larger than those found in plurality systems.  They tend to 
have a larger number of  effective parties in parliament and are characterized by 
multi-party majority or either one-party or multi-party minority governments.
14  
Empirical evidence has consistently supported this relationship, e.g. Lijphart (1984, 
161).
15    
    Table 7 compares the electoral systems of most OECD countries.  A few 
points require clarification.  First, PR systems do not translate the percentage of 
votes directly into the percentage of seats, and smaller parties often cannot gain 
entry into the legislature.  We noted previously that district magnitude affects the 
number of political parties possible, and a logical comparison would be between this 
figure and the likelihood of one-party government.  Yet such a comparison would be 
somewhat misleading--as the third column in Table 7 indicates, states sometimes 
have different district magnitudes at different levels of the allocation process.  In 
addition, other factors that district magnitude does not measure, including legal 
                                                             
12. Thomas T. Mackie and Richard Rose (1991, 397, 399).  The average district magnitude figures is reported 
in Lijphart (1994, 22). 
 
 13. Other factors which affect proportionality include legal barriers which require a party to gain a certain 
percentage of the national vote to win legislative seats, the method used to apportion seats, and whether or not a 
second allocation of seats is used to reduce disparities at the district level. A succinct summary is found in 
Gallagher, Laver, and Mair (1992, 153-159). 
 
 14. A reasonable measure for the number of parties considers the strength of parties as well as their absolute 
number.  The measure that will be used here is for the effective number of parties in parliament and is taken 
from Mark Laakso and Rein Taagepera, as quoted in Lijphart (1884, 68).  It is calculated as N=1/S si 
2, where N 
equals the effective number of parties and si equals the proportion of seats party i possess in the legislature. 
   
15. Other empirical studies that confirm this link include Lijphart (1994) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989 and 
1993).  
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thresholds (such as Germany's requirement that a party win either 5% of the nation-
wide vote or three seats by plurality vote) and rules for the allocation of seats (use of 
the D'Hondt method for allocating seats) favor larger parties over smaller ones.   
Arend Lijphart solves our problem of how to aggregate these institutional effects with 
his translation of such factors into an effective threshold, which is the percentage of 
the national vote a party expects it must receive to gain any legislative seats. 
 Table 7 confirms the general link among electoral institutions, the number of 
parties, and the likelihood of a one-party majority government for the sample of 
OECD countries.  The correlation between the effective threshold and the number of 
parties has the correct sign at  -.59, and it jumps to -.69, if France is excluded from 
the sample.  The most important figure is the correlation which links the occurrence 
of one-party majority governments with higher effective thresholds, and the 
correlation of .69 indicates that this relationship is relatively strong.  Since states 
which have low district magnitudes also have higher effective thresholds, this result 
indicates that plurality elections or PR systems with low district magnitudes are likely 
to have one-party majority governments.  In contrast, PR systems with high district 
magnitudes usually have either multi-party majority governments or minority 
governments. 
Data from Latin America and the Caribbean reinforce this conclusion. Stein et 
al (1997), in their examination of 26 countries from the two regions, report that the 
correlation coefficient between the district magnitude in the lower legislative house 
and effective number of legislative parties is .58, while the coefficient between the 
number of parties and the percentage of seats the sitting government possesses is 
even higher at .79. 
Coming back to the institutional choice for centralizing the budget process, the 
correlation between electoral institutions and the number of parties in governments 
the suggests, that countries with PR systems should be more likely to adopt a 
contract approach, while countries with a plurality system should opt for the 
delegation approach, if they adopt centralizing institutions at all. Table 8 considers 
the institutional design of budget processes in the European Union to test that 
hypothesis. It shows that the choice of centralizing approach can indeed be 
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predicted with a high degree of certainty on the basis of the electoral system, hence 
the composition of government. 
  
V.3. Presidential Systems 
 
Presidential systems of government are different from parliamentary systems 
in that the president is the leader of the executive and is directly elected. The 
president, therefore,  does not rely directly on the legislature for his position. Voters 
can, and often do, support a president from one party while denying his party a 
majority in the legislature.  In the United States, for example, a president has faced 
an opposition-controlled House or Senate 19 of the past 25 years. In Latin American 
and Caribbean countries during the period 1990-95, half of the twenty countries with 
presidential systems had presidents facing opposition-controlled lower houses (Stein 
et al, 1997).  Coordination of budgetary decisions between the executive and 
parliament becomes obviously more difficult, when the president and the majority in 
parliament come from two different parties. In fact ... show that in the years from 
1868 to 19.. federal government deficits in the US were significantly lower in times 
when the president faces a majority in congress from his own party. In countries with 
presidential systems that elect their legislatures with proportional representation, it is 
likely that the number will be greater than two. 
The role of the executive in the budget process is not much different in 
presidential systems. Since the president typically appoints the members of his 
administration - with confirmation by the legislature where applicable - the structure 
of the administration lends itself more to a delegation approach than to a contract 
approach to centralizing the budget process. The relationship between the president 
and the legislature, however, is often more difficult, since the two are conceived to 
be more equal political institutions than in parliamentary forms of governments. 
Where presidential forms of government are combined with plurality electoral 
systems, the president will face typically just two parties in the legislature, hence only 
one opposing party, although party discipline in his own party may be low. Where 
presidential systems are combined with PR electoral systems, the president may 
even be from a minority party in the legislature, and be in a relatively weak position.  
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 Centralization in presidential systems then must emphasize two institutional 
dimensions. One is the internal organization of the legislature. Here, centralization 
can be achieved by creating a strong leadership in parliament, through an elevated 
position of the speaker and through a hierarchical committee structure.  
  The other dimension regards the relation between the executive and the 
legislature. The more the constitution puts the two institutions on an equal footing, 
the more budget agreements between the two must rely on the contract approach. 
Inman (1993) emphasizes the importance of the president’s command over sufficient 




V.4.  Balanced Budget Laws 
 
Constitutional constraints on budgetary aggregates - usually the deficit - are 
often considered as a device to improve fiscal discipline. In the US, a constitutional 
requirement for a balanced federal budget was discussed in the mid-1990s. In 
Europe, the debate over fiscal discipline in the European Monetary Union has so far 
paid more attention to the numerical constraints of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact than to institutional reform, although the Maastricht Treaty 
calls for institutional reform of the national budget processes and although the 
successful cases of the Maastricht process have strongly relied on   procedural 
reforms. Constitutional constraints are also often found as a mechanism to limit the 
borrowing of subnational governments (von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996; Stein et 
al, 1997). Legal, numerical constraints may seem more attractive as institutional 
devices to contain deficits, since they are more visible and more easily understood 
than procedural reform. The recent move to such constraints in most Canadian 
provinces suggests that numerical constraints play a large role when the impetus for 
fiscal consolidation comes directly from disgruntled taxpayers who wish to impose 
greater constraints on the spending profligacy of their elected representatives (Millar, 
1997)16. Several Canadian provinces have adopted laws providing for significant 
                                                           
 16. The new Canadian Laws are often part of a legislation calling for „taxpayer protection“. See Millar (1997).  
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salary cuts imposed on members of the executive when the borrowing constraints 
are violated. 
It is interesting, therefore, to see how successful such constraints in achieving 
the desired goal. Here, it is particularly useful to consider the experience of American 
state governments, since almost all state governments in the US have some 
constraints on either the size of the deficits or the size of public debt they can issue. 
These constraints come in varying degrees of strictness, however, ranging from 
constraining only the governor's budget proposal to be balanced to an outright ban 
on revenue out-turns falling short of expenditures. ACIR (1987) and Strauch (1998)  
provide overviews and a characterizations of these constraints.  
Table 9 reports a panel regression of  the deficit ratios of American state 
governments on a set of control variable and an index characterizing the strictness of 
the numerical constraint. This regression indicates that numerical constraints are 
effective to limit the deficit. However, when the same regression is performed for the 
primary deficit and includes the institutional index, there is no significant effect of 
numerical constraints. Eichengreen (1990) shows that the stringency of numerical 
constraints has a significant and negative effect on a state's debt ratio. However, 
Eichengreen considers only the level of full faith and credit debt, i.e., debt that is fully 
and explicitly guaranteed by the state government. von Hagen (1991) broadens the 
perspective including other debt, too, such as debt issued by public authorities. He 
finds that the stringency of numerical constraints has no effect on the total debt. The 
two results are, of course, easy to reconcile: They suggest that states subject to 
stringent numerical deficit constraints tend to substitute debt instruments not covered 
by the legal rule (resulting from off-budget activities) for full faith and credit debt.  
Kiewiet and Szakalay (1996) find a similar effect by showing that states with more 
restrictive borrowing constraints imposed on the state government tend to have 
larger debts incurred by municipal governments.  
von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996) show  in a cross-country comparison that 
countries where subnational governments are subject to stringent statutory 
borrowing constraints tend to have higher debt ratios of their central governments. 
This indicates a second substitution effect: Where subnational governments are not 
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allowed to borrow in their own authority, they tend to pressure the central 
government to borrow on their behalf.       
  The important lesson to learn from this is that numerical constraints induce 
substitution effects that work against the intended effect on aggregate fiscal 
discipline. As institutional mechanisms to strengthen aggregate fiscal discipline, the 
difference between such constraints and the centralization of the budget process is 
that balanced budget laws rely on fixed rules, while centralization relies on strategic 
design of the budget process.  Centralization has the advantage that it gives 
authority to people who are able to monitor the behavior of others, and can therefore 
react to attempts to circumvade the rules constraining their behavior.  
 
  
V.5. Trade-offs in the Design of Budgeting Institutions 
 
Apart from its constitutional function, government budgeting serves a number 
of other purposes. Budgets serve as forecasts of the government’s financial activities 
during a year, budgetary policy is used to counteract movements in the business 
cycle, and budgetary policies must be flexible enough to cope with unexpected 
changes in the economic environment. This raises the possibility that budget 
processes that serve the constitutional function well might be less appropriate for 
other purposes.  
Regarding the forecasting function of the budget, von Hagen and Harden 
(1994) perform the following, simple exercise. They evaluate the precision of budget 
forecasts of 12 European Union governments in the 1980s and correlate their 
performance with the quality of their budget processes. The result is that countries 
ranking high on their institutional index tend to have higher quality budget forecasts 
in the sense that the forecasts are less biased and have smaller standard errors. 
This is consistent with the view, mentioned above, that the information quality of the 
budget process is an input into the institutional index. 
Lao-Araya (1997) claims  that there is a trade-off between transparency, or 
information quality, and  centralization of the budget process. It is easy to see that 
this claim is unwarranted. First, Lao-Arayo, like Alesina et al equates centralization  
  30 
with hierarchies, which, as shown above, is not generally correct both in theory and 
practice. Where centralization is based on contracts, transparency is a necessary 
condition, since contracts need transparency to be understood and executed. 
Second, even where centralization is based on delegation, transparency will 
ultimately strengthen the position of the finance minister, since his task to contain the 
spending bias resulting from the CPR problem is easier to fulfil, if all other 
participants in the budget process can verify that they are not being treated unfairly.  
However, a strong finance minister might have an incentive to obscure 
budgetary developments in order to hide his own actions. This is most likely to occur 
if the finance minister wishes to abuse his elevated position to enforce his own 
preferred allocation of public funds against the opposition of his fellow cabinet 
members.  This could happen, for example, if the finance minister of a coalition 
government is vested with strong agenda setting powers, and the coalition members 
have very different views on their preferred allocation of funds. Yet, in light of our 
earlier arguments, the problem in such a scenario is that the wrong approach to 
centralization was chosen, not that centralization contradicts transparency. 
Finally, finance ministers that, on the basis of the political constitution have a 
weak position only in their cabinets or relative to the legislature may try to strengthen 
their position by monopolizing and manipulating information about fiscal data. 
Specifically, they may try to hide revenues and bias revenue forecasts downwards to 
keep spending demands low. But while such behavior may mitigate the CPR 
problem to some extent, it is clear that this is not an appropriate solution to the 
common pool problem of budgeting. Delegation or contracts, combined with 
transparency are clearly preferable.   
The second trade-off suggested by Lao-Arayo is one between transparency 
and flexibility. According to this view, hiding budgetary information gives the 
executive more discretion to react to unforeseen events; and decentralization 
reserves authority for those departments hit by such events. But this view is 
unwarranted, since it does not consider the full effects of hidden information and 
decentralization on the executive’s ability to agree on a reaction to unforeseen 
events. Generally, collective agreements are much faster to obtain in settings where 
information is shared and there are clear leadership structures (e.g. Velasco,  
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forthcoming). 
Flexibility in the implementation of the budget to react to unforeseen events is, 
of course, desirable. Such flexibility can be achieved in a number of ways without 
working against centralization. The Swedish government recently adopted a budget 
law that allows spending departments to charge expenditures against future budgets 
or transfer unused appropriations to the next year. Both transfers are possible, 
however, only for a limited number of years. Since the charges and transfers must 
be budgeted in the following year, the provision combines flexibility with transparency 
and gives both the legislature and the finance minister the ability to control the flow 
of expenditures. 
An alternative way to create flexibility is the creation of a rainy day fund, i.e., 
an unspecified appropriation that can be used for emergencies. An example is the 
(Contingency) Reserve included annually in the UK budget (von Hagen and Harden, 
1994). The purpose of the Reserve, which amounts to 2 - 4 percent of the budget 
total, is to deal with unanticipated expenditures without overrunning the aggregate 
targets imposed on the spending departments. According to a rule introduced in 
1976, a refusal by the finance minister to charge an expenditure against the Reserve 
could only be overruled by the entire cabinet; an allocation made from the Reserve  
does not increase a spending department’s baseline allocatin for the subsequent 
budget planning processes. Again, the critical point is to budget the fund annually 
and to submit spending out of this fund to the same rules of expenditure 
management as ordinary spending.    
The ability of budgetary policies to counteract cyclical fluctations is an 
important concern. To see whether delegation and contracts tend to reduce a 
government’s capacity to react appropriately, we consider a variation of the previous 
regression for European governments. Here, the dummy variable „delegation“ is one 
for countries adhering to a delegation approach and zero elsewhere, the "contracts" 
dummy is defined accordingly. Furthermore, we multiply these dummies with an 
interactive dummy variable which is one in years of recession (negative real growth) 
and zero elsewhere. Table 10 shows the results. The negative coefficient on the 
interactive terms indicate that governments using either one of these approaches 
react more strongly to cyclical downturns than governments with fragmented budget  
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processes. Only for the delegation approach, however, this is statistically significant. 
A likely explanation is that finance ministers are able to react more quickly to 
economic downturns than the spending ministers of the cabinet. Thus, the results 
lend no support to the  claim that sound fiscal institutions would make a country less 
able to use fiscal policy for macro-economic stabilization. 
  One important event during a fiscal year is a change in the players that 
negotiate the budget through elections or a break-up of the ruling coalition. Political-
economy literature has often linked elections with government-inspired changes to 
the macro-economy for short-term electoral gain at the expense of longer-term 
economic growth (Nordhaus 1975; MacRae 1977).
17  Furthermore, a spending 
minister expecting to be replaced soon in the government may not fear the 
punishment that either a finance minister (under delegation) or other coalition 
partners (under contracts) would levy on him for defecting from the budget 
agreement. The expectation here is that deficits would increase both in election 
years and in years where there were changes in the coalition.   
To examine these arguments, Table 11 presents regression results that 
include both a variable for the year of an election and an interaction term for 
elections with the two budgetary approaches. The data indicate that contracts 
restrain the political business cycle while delegation does not.  This makes intuitive 
sense--under fiscal contracts the players do not want to let their coalition partners 
gain an edge over them so they do not allow any slippage at all, while in a one party 
government a finance minister may allow some deterioration in the budget if he 
thinks it affects the very survival of the government. 
 
 VI. Outside Enforcement of Budget Agreements 
 
Interpreting government budgeting as a CPR problem implies that the key to 
                                                           
17. The hope is that higher spending before an election will attract additional voters to the ruling government.  
The evidence for such "political business cycles has been decidedly mixed.  Even in the landmark article that 
began the debate, Nordhaus 1975 found evidence for such cycles in just four of nine cases he examined (see also 
Alesina 1989; Davidson, Fratianni, and von Hagen 1992; Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini 1993; Clark and Reichert 
(Forthcoming) find some evidence in states with dependent central banks.  
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achieving aggregate fiscal discipline is to broker a budget agreement that is efficient 
for all decision makers involved together, but that is vulnerable to defections from 
each one of them. Effective enforcement of the budget agreement is, therefore, a 
necessary condition for aggregate fiscal discipline. Delegation and contracts are both 
centralizing institutions that rely on enforcement mechanisms within the government 
itself; the penalties a strong finance minister can impose on defecting spending 
ministers under the delegation approach, and the threat of breaking up the coalition 
under the contract approach. An alternative is to consider enforcement mechanisms 
brought from the outside.   
One such approach follows the logic of independent central banks in 
appointing an independent agency, the National Debt Board. This was first proposed 
in the European context by von Hagen and Harden (1994), and for Latin American 
countries by Eichengreen, Hausmann, and von Hagen (1996). The Board’s mandate 
is to assure the stability of the country’s public finances. It’s main task is to 
pronounce annually the maximum increase in public debt that the government is 
allowed to incur during that year. The Board consists of individuals independent from 
the government and is accountable in its task to the parliament. Parliament can 
dissolve the Board if it feels that the Board is not executing its functions properly, 
however, in doing so, it cannot overrule the Board’s current pronouncement of a 
maximum debt increase. Importantly, the Board would be vested with the authority to 
impose across-the-board spending cuts and cash limits if the government overruns 
its limit. See table 12 for further institutional details. 
The Board would be preferable to a balanced budget rule, as it can take into 
account the current state of the economy and other factors that might affect the 
desirable stance of fiscal policy. Note that the Board’s task is not to pronounce how 
large the deficit will be every year, instead, it only imposes an upper limit on the 
government’s choice of a deficit. Note also that the Board has no mandate to 
determine the allocation of public spending and taxes, although it will have an 
incentive to justify its pronouncements with a detailed view of the government’s fiscal 
policy. 
The main task of the National Debt Board is to enforce an upper limit of the 
growth of public debt. In doing so, it is likely that the existence of the Board would  
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encourage the government to spell out its fiscal intentions. In this sense, the Board 
would promote a contract on a budget program between itself, the executive, and the 
legislature. 
One country that recently adopted an institution like a the National Debt Board 
proposed by von Hagen and Harden is Belgium. To help strengthen aggregate fiscal 
discipline after the country was re-organized as a federal state in the late 1980s, 
Belgium created the Fiscal Council, composed of independent advisors and 
representatives of the regions, the communities, and the national government.  
Another avenue for external enforcement of budget agreements is to rely on 
international financial organizations. Specifically, IMF assistance programs regularly 
come with fiscal conditionalities that impose constraints on the recipient country’s 
fiscal policy for some time. The purpose of these conditionalities is to help stabilize 
the country’s economy and its public finances. IMF conditionality can be regarded as 
a contract between the recipient government and the IMF on a set of broad fiscal 
targets. The IMF’s enforcement power is derived from the threat that the financial 
assistance will not be disbursed if the targets are violated. 
But the IMF approach has, at least, two severe limitations. First, assistance 
programs are agreements between the IMF and the executive, and the legislature 
may not feel bound by this agreement. There is, therefore, little hope that the outside 
enforcement would work in political settings where the executive has weak control 
only over the legislature. This indicates that outside enforcement based on IMF 
programs may work in countries where the executive strongly controls the 
legislature, but that it will be less effective in countries where this is not the case.  
Second, IMF assistance programs come in times of crisis, i.e., when public 
finances are already in disarray. In more normal times, the IMF has little scope for 
enforcing fiscal programs, since it has no penalties to impose. Finally, IMF 
conditionalities pay no attention to allocative processes. Responding to the need to 
cut spending rapidly, governments of poor countries often implement these 
conditionalities by cutting welfare programs for the poorest parts of the population, 
future-oriented spending programs such as education. As a result, IMF 
conditionalities become equated with poor allocative results, which makes the 
concept of external enforcement of budget agreements unpopular in normal times.  
  35 
The preparation of European Monetary Union has furnished another example 
of enforcing budget agreements through an international organization. Aspirant 
countries for the monetary union in fact signed a contract committing them to a set of 
broad fiscal targets over a period of six years. These countries had to submit 
Convergence Reports explaining the government’s strategy to meet these targets. 
The European Commission, after reviewing these reports and the relevant data 
issued judgements of the countries’ fiscal stance, which became the basis for the 
European Council’s assessment whether or not a country had an excessive deficit. 
Here, the external enforcement power was permanent (six years) and carried a 
bigger penalty (exclusion from the monetary union).  
 The success of the Maastricht program, however, has been limited. A number 
of the smaller countries, Portugal and Ireland in particular, used the convergence 
process for a successful reduction of their deficits and debts. Yet, when the 
Maastricht process started in 1992, the average debt ratio of the European Union 
states was 60 percent, today it is over 75 percent. A closer look reveals that this 
increase was driven entirely by the fiscal developments in Germany, France, Spain, 
Italy, and the UK, which did not commit itself to the process. It is probably no 
coincidence that the other four countries are the largest countries among the 11 
candidates for EMU. In large countries such as Germany and France, the role of 
external political constraints such as admonitions brought by the European 
Commission is simply too weak to coerce internal politics. This suggests that the 
effectiveness of  outside actors in enforcing budget agreements depends critically on 
the importance of international organizations in domestic politics, which is plausibly a 
function of the size of the country. 
  
 
 VII. Institutional Reform 
  
We have argued that lacking fiscal discipline can largely be explained by 
institutional deficiencies of the budget process that allow the common pool resource 
problem of public budgeting to become rampant. Both theory and evidence from a 
considerable variety of countries support that argument. Can conclude from this that  
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institutional reform is an effective way to combat lacking fiscal discipline? 
Our basic claim has been that institutions frame the decisions made within 
them. This contention rests on the proposition that the same individuals facing a 
decision problem make different decisions in different institutional environments, 
implying that institutions effectively constrain idividual choices. The obvious objection 
is, why do these individuals not rid themselves of the institutions and change the 
rules if they feel constraint by the current ones? After all, institutions are man-made 
and subject to change. Without a satisfactory answer to this question, the power of 
institutions and the promises of institutional reform must remain in doubt. 
Such an answer has three points. First, the individuals involved in the budget 
process do not alsways have the authority themselves to change the rules. The 
relevant institutions may be cast in constitutional law or historical traditions that are 
hard to modify. Second, the claim that institutions impose constraints on individual 
decisions does not imply that these individuals will want to change the institutions. 
They will only want to do that, if they can be reasonably sure that they can reach 
more desirable outcomes in the modified environment. Since complex political and 
economic decisions made in groups of people are prone to instability and 
irrationality, an environment with less rules is often much less desirable than an 
environment with rules even if their constraints are being felt. Third, institutional rules 
in the budget context serve to coordinate individual choices. Specifically, they give 
individual participants assurance that excessive budget demands by other 
participants will not be successful, and thus make it easier for the former to agree to 
demand less himself. Again, the implication is that abolishing institutional constraints 
is not necessarily desirable. 
Nevertheless, one should not overinterpret the results as saying that a mere 
change in the law is an effective means to reduce deficits. Precisely because 
changing institutions takes some extraordinary effort, policy makers are unlikely to 
do that unless they are aware of an acute fiscal problem. But if that is the case, how 
can we prove that the institutional change contributed to the fiscal correction, if the 
latter was what policy makers wanted anyway? 
A first point is that institutional changes are very visible to the public and the 
markets and, therefore provide an important signalling function. Governments  
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showing the resolve for a more disciplined fiscal policy by reforming pertinent 
institutions will find it easier to convince the public and financial markets of their good 
intentions. To the extent that this reduces opposition against fiscal cutbacks, the 
consolidation is made easier. 
A second point is that the awareness of a fiscal problem may not be 
permanent. As other problems arise and the deficit returns to normal levels, the 
attention to the deficit is reduced and the tendency for overspending and excessive 
deficits rises again. At that point, centralization of the budget process can be an 
important mechanism to preserve the collective memory of the previous crisis.          
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  Table 1: Steps in the Budget Process 
 
   Action 
Executive Planning Stage 
G1  Formulation of budget targets and guidelines 
G2  Preparation of budget bids 
G3  Compilation of budget draft 
G4  Reconciliation 
G5  Finalization of budget proposal 
Legislative Approval Stage 
P1  Debate, amendment of, and vote on budget proposal 
P2  Reconciliation between upper and lower houses 
P3  Approval by government 
Implementation Stage 
I1  Execution of the budget act 
I2  In-year changes of the budget 
Ex-post Control and Accountability 
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Note: B=Belgium, DK=Denmark, F=France, D=Germany, GR=Greece, IRL=Ireland, I=Italy, L=Luxembourg, 






















































  46 
Note: arg=Argentina, bah=Bahamas, bol=Bolivia, bra=Brazil, chi=Chile, col=Columbia, dor=Dominican 
Republic, ecu=Ecuador, Gua=Guatemala, hon=Honduras, jam=Jamaica, mex=Mexico, pan=Panama, 
par=Paraguay, esa=El Salvador, tat=Trinidad and Tobago, uru=Uruguay, Ven=Venezuela  







ban ind ina korea malay nep pak phi sin srl tha




Note: ban=Bangladesh, ind=India, ina=Indonesia, malay=Malaysia, nep=Nepal, pak=Pakistan, phi=Phillipines, 
sin=Singapore, srl=Sri Lanka, tha=Thailand 
 
 
Table 3: Simple Regressions 
 
1.   West European States 
 
Deficit  =  0.12        -  0.69*Index of Centralization         R
2  =  0.37 
(0.35)     (0.14) 
  
Note: 15 States, averages 1981-85, 1986-90, 1991-95, dependent variable is surplus/GDP 
source: von Hagen and Harden, 1996 
 
 
2.   Latin American Countries 
 
Primary Deficit=        0.10  -  0.21*Index of Centralization         R
2   = 0.39 
                                 (0.03)     (0.06) 
                          
 
Note: 28 States, average 1990-95 
source: Stein et al. (1997) 
 
 
3.   Asian Countries 
 
Primary Deficit = -0.35  -  0.44*Index of Centralization  -  0.13*Dummy Singapur  R
2  = 0.88 
(0.2)       (0.10)                                           (0.02) 
 
Note: 11 states, average 1986-95 
source: Lao-Araya (1997)  
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Table 4: Cross Section Regression European States, Dependent Variable: Change in 
Debt/GDP 
Variable  Coefficient  standard error  t-ratio  p 
constant  3.58  .87  4.12  0.000 
lagged dependent  .31  .054  5.88  0.000 




0.75  0.28  2.66  0.008 
Real interest rate  -0.07  0.10  -0.69  0.49 
2-3 parties in 
government 
0.93  0.72  1.28  0.20 
4-5 parties in 
government 
0.76  0.90  0.37  0.37 
minority 
government 
-0.23  0.83  -0.28  0.78 
Change in 
executive 
1.59  0.45  3.55  0.0005 
Percentage of 
cabinet seats for 
leftist parties 
-0.53  0.64  -0.84  0.40 
Index of 
centralization 
-0.12  0.059  -2.14  0.034 
Sample 1981 - 1994, 15 states, Dof 199, adjusted R
2 = 0.51, F(10. 199) = 22.5. 
 
 
Table 5: American State Governments, Dependent Variable Deficit Ratio 
 
Variable Coefficient  t-value   
South  -.30 -2.2  
Population  .01 1.3  
Population density  .0002  1.0   
Urbanization .001  .3   
Per capita income  -.00  -1.0   
Unemployment  .09 4.3  
Share of Dependent Population  .02  .8   
Share of federal grants in state income  -.06  -.9   
Democrat  Governor  -.18 -2.4  
Upper house ruled by democrats  -.18  -1.6   
Lower house ruled by democrats  -.02  -.10   
Divided  government  -.16 -1.8  
Divided  legislature  -.13 -1.4  
Index of Centralization  -.07  -2.2   
Constant  3.24 1.96  
 
Note: „Divided government“ is a dummy with a one if the governor’s party affiliation differs from the party 
holding a majority in the lower house or the upper house; „Divided legislature“ is a dummy with a one if the party 
holding a majority in the lower  house is different from the party holding a majority in the upper house. Annual 
dummies suppressed. Annual data for 47 states, 1982-92. Adjusted R
2 = 0.56  
Source: Strauch 1998  
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Table 6: Comparison of Committee Monitoring Power and Budgetary Institutions 
















Austria 1  0 1 1 3  Contracts 
Denmark 1  1 1 0 3  Contracts 
Finland 0  1 0 1 2  Contracts 
Luxembourg 1  1 0 1 3  Contracts 
Netherlands 1  1 0 0 2  Contracts 
France 0  0 1 1 2  Delegation 
Germany 1  1 0 0 2  Delegation 
U. K.  0  0 0 0 0 Delegation 
Belgium 1  1 0 0 2  Contracts 
Greece 0  0 0 0 0   
Italy 1  0 0 0 1   
Portugal 1  1 1 0 3   
Spain 1  1 1 1 4   
Sweden 1  1 0 1 3   
 
Source: Hallerberg (1997).  The respective variable is coded as 1 if the answer is yes and 0 if it is no. The 
committee data is adopted from Mattson and Strøm (1995), 261-64, 279-81, and 287-90.  The data on the budgetary 
institutions is from Hallerberg and von Hagen (Forthcoming). The first column indicates whether or not a 
committee‘s area of responsibility corresponds with a government ministry.  If this correspondence exists, a 
committee will presumably have a greater capacity to monitor that ministry.  The second category is the 
appointment process for the chairperson of the committee.  If the chairs are distributed proportionally, it is likely 
that the chair will come from a different party than the respective minister, and it will be harder for the minister 
to conceal her actions.  The last two categories measure a committee‘s ability to compel either witnesses or 
documents from the government. 
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Table 7: Electoral Systems in 21 OECD Countries 



















Australia Alternative  Vote  1 2.35 35 84-90 100
Austria 2-Tier  PR, 
Remainder 
Transfers 
20/91 2.42 2.6 71-90 44
Belgium PR  23 4.63 4.8 46-87 17
Canada Plurality  1 2.37 35 45-88 60
Denmark 2-Tier  PR, 
Adjustment 
Seats 
         7/175 4.92 2 64-88 0
Finland PR  13 5.03 5.4 45-87 0






  1/497 2.95 5 57-83 0
Greece 'Reinforced'  PR  6 2.08 16.4 74-85 95
Ireland STV  4 2.79 17.2 48-89 36
Italy 2-Tier  PR, 
Remainder 
Transfers 
19/625 3.62 2 58-87 0
Japan SNTV  4 2.88 16.4 47-90 75
Luxembourg PR  14 3.3 5.1 45-89 0
Netherlands PR  150 4.59 0.67 56-89 0
New Zealand  Plurality  1 1.95 35 46-90 100
Norway PR  8/165 4.23 4 89 0
Portugal PR  12 3.05 5.7 75-87 33
Spain PR  6 2.72 10.2 77-89 58
Sweden 2-Tier  PR  11/350 3.4 4 70-88 10
U. K.  Plurality  1 2.1 35 45-87 99
U.S. Plurality  1 1.92 35 46-90 100
 
"PR" corresponds to "Proportional Representation," "STV" to "Single Transferable Vote," and "ENPP" to "Effective 
Number of Parliamentary Parties."  All figures but those on one-party majorities come from Lijphart 1994, 17, 22, 
31,33-35, 44, 160-162; Lijphart￿s one party majority figures were supplemented with Woldendorp, Keman, and 
Budge (1993).  Greece, Portugal, and Spain were not democracies during the entire period, and the years covered 
are, respectively, 1974-90, 1975-90, and 1977-90. This data is published in various issues of the European Journal 
of Political Research, and is based on the date of an election instead of the date of investiture used for the other 
countries.  The figures for France are just for its Fifth Republic, or 1958-90, and include the period 1986-88 when 
the country used a proportional representation system.  The Austrian, Irish, and Portuguese data were not 
completely accurate in Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (1993).  The authors supplemented the Austrian and 
Portuguese data themselves, while Jesse (1996) was used for Ireland for the period 1951-90. District magnitude 
figures are rounded to the nearest whole number.  Brian Woodall provided data on one-party government in Japan. 
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Table 8: Predicted and Actual Institutional Solutions, 1981-94 
 































































Contracts Fragmented  Process  
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Table 9: American State Governments, Dependent Variable Deficit Ratio 
 
Variable Coefficient  t-value  Coefficient  t-value 
South -.14  -1.1  -.26  2.0 
Population -.004  -.4  -.00  .1 
Population density  .0003  1.0  .00  10.0 
Urbanization -.003  -.7  .003  1.0 
Per capita income  -.00  -1.1  -.00  1.25 
Unemployment .08  4.1  .10  5.0 
Share of Dependent Population  -.00  -.03  -.002  .7 
Share of federal grants in state income  -.11  -1.5  -.10  1.4 
Democrat Governor  -.16  -2.1  -.15  2.2 
Upper house ruled by democrats  -.12  -1.1  -.10  .9 
Lower house ruled by democrats  -.02  -.20  .01  .01 
Divided government  -.12  -1.4  -.12  1.3 
Divided legislature  -.11  -1.1  -.12  1.2 
Strictness of numerical constraint  -.16  -3.0  -.06  2.5 
Index of centralization      -.15  2.0 
Constant 2.74  1.70  3.1  1.9 
 
Note: „Divided government“ is a dummy with a one if the governor’s party affiliation differs from the party 
holding a majority in the lower house or the upper house; „Divided legislature“ is a dummy with a one if the party 
holding a majority in the lower  is different from the party holding a majority in the upper house. Annual data for 
47 states, 1982-92. Adjusted R
2 = 0.56 and  .59. 
Source: Strauch 1998  
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Table 10: Macroeconomic Stabilization and Budgeting Institutions  
    Dependent Variable: Change in Debt/GDP 










Constant    4.4  1.2  3.6  .0005 
Change in Debt t-1    0.3  .06  5.1  0.0001 
Change in GDP  -1.0  .2  -6.0  0.0001 
Change in Unemployment Rate    0.9  .3  3.0  0.003 
Change in Debt Servicing Costs  -0.03  0.1  -.3  .74 
Election.    1.3  .5  2.5  .01 
2-3 Party Majority Govt.    1  .7  1.4  .16 
4-5 Party Majority Govt.    0.9  .8  1.1  .26 
Minority Govt.  -0.4  .8  -.6  .58 
Share of Cabinet Seats of  
Leftist Parties 
-0.9 .7  -1.3  .18 
Delegation Dummy  -1.9  .8  -2.2  .03 
Contracts Dummy  -1.7  .63  -2.7  .01 
Neggrowth * Delegation Dummy   -2.5  1.1  -2.2  .03 
Neggrowth * Contracts Dummy  -0.5  .5  -1.1  .28 
 
R squared = 53.8%     R squared (adjusted) = 50.7% 
 
 
Table 11: Elections and Budgeting Institutions  
   Dependent Variable: Change in Debt/GDP 










Constant    3.4  1.2  2.8  .01 
Change in Debt t-1    0.3  .06  5.4  0.0001 
Change in GDP  -0.9  .16  -5.3  0.0001 
Change in Unemployment Rate    0.9  .3  3.0  0.003 
Change in Debt Servicing Costs   -0.02  0.1  -.2  .80 
Election.    2.8  .8  3.6  0.0004 
2-3 Party Majority Govt.    1  .7  1.4  .16 
4-5 Party Majority Govt.    0.8  .8  .9  .36 
Minority Govt.  -0.3  .8  -.4  .67 
Share of Cabinet Seats of 
Leftist Parties 
-0.7 .7  -1.1  0.29 
Delegation Dummy  -1.7  .9  -1.9  .06 
Contracts Dummy  -0.8  .7  -1.2  .24 
Election * Delegation Dummy  -1.9  1.4  -1.4  .13 
Election * Contracts Dummy  -3.2  1.1  -2.8  0.005 
 
R squared: 54.3% R Squared (Adjusted) 51.3% 
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1. To safeguard the soundness and stability of public finances. 
2. Without prejudice to the above, to support the 




1. Institutional home in the National Debt Institute 
2. Non-renewable, staggered appointments for eight 
   years or 1.5 times the election period of the central government whichever is 
larger. 
3. Non-eligibility for appointments in government for  
five years after termination of appointment.  
4. Not allowed to take instructions from government.  
Allowed to take advice from government only if such advice is made public. 





Two full-time appointments and up to five additional part-time or full-time 
appointments for candidates that must have recognized expertise and good standing 




1. By law prohibiting government to exceed the annual 
   Debt Change Limit. If actual borrowing exceeds the Debt Change Limit, 
spending would be restricted for the rest of the year. 
2. By monitoring actual borrowing and the budget by 
   the State Audit Institution and the Debt Monitoring Commission at the  




1. By legal requirement to explain the derivation of 
   the Debt Change Limit. 
2. Parliament, upon recommendation by the government, 
   can dismiss the members of the National Debt Board, however, dismissal 




National Debt Institute and National Debt Board  





1. Government can override Debt Change Limit  
following a declaration of war. 
2. The National Debt Board can change the Debt Change  
Limit following a declaration of national disaster. 
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